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Introduction
The years following the Great Recession have been quite challenging from a forecasting point of view. The deep recession was not followed by a swift recovery, unlike in previous post-war deep recessions, but instead generated a persistent output gap. This large gap was however not associated with negative inflation, as a traditional Phillips curve relationship would have predicted, resulting in what Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) called the "missing deflation" (see also Hall, 2011; Ball and Mazumder, 2011; and Del Negro et al., 2015a) . At the same time the federal funds rate was stuck at near zero levels for several years. This prompted the central bank to use tools that had never been used before, such as quantitative easing (henceforth, QE) and forward guidance. On top of all this, the U.S. economy found itself in the middle of both a demographic transition caused by the retirement of baby boomers, and a secular downward shift in the growth rate of total factor productivity, at least according to some authors (see, among others, Fernald, 2015; Fernald et al., 2017; Gordon, 2015) .
This combination of unusual, far-from-steady-state conditions presented a challenging environment for any econometric model, but in particular for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models in the tradition of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) , due to their rigid structure and tight cross-equation restrictions. Over the past decade, these models have become part of many central banks' forecasting and policy analysis toolbox, and the post-Great Recession setting surely provided an important real-time test of their predictive accuracy. So how did these models fare?
Against this backdrop, this paper pursues two objectives. The first objective consists in addressing the question above as far as the Federal Bank of New York DSGE model (henceforth, NY Fed DSGE) is concerned. Specifically, Section 2 of the paper documents how the NY Fed DSGE model fared in terms of real-time forecasting accuracy relative to forecasters such as those surveyed in the Blue Chip survey or the Survey of Professional Forecasters (henceforth, SPF), as well as the Federal Reserve System's Summary of Economic Projections (henceforth, SEP), and how researchers using the model coped with the difficulties discussed above. It will also discuss how the model changed to incorporate financial frictions anduse financial data as observables.
The second objective of the paper consists in complementing this real real-time forecasting exercise with a pseudo real-time analogue (Section 3). The main goal of this exercise
is to understand what model features, and observables, explain the performance of the NY Fed DSGE model. In addition, this exercise extends the historical forecast accuracy comparison of Edge and Gürkaynak (2010) and Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) both in terms of the period and the models considered. In fact, their comparison did not focus on the post-Great Recession years, which were not considered at all in Edge and Gürkaynak (2010) and barely included in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) (their sample ends in early 2011).
Moreover, Edge and Gürkaynak (2010) only consider the Smets and Wouters (2007) model while Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) mainly focus on the performance of close variants of this model. Here, the centerpiece of our analysis will be models with financial frictions (e.g., Christiano et al., 2014; Del Negro et al., 2015b; Del Negro et al., 2016 ) that incorporate corporate spreads as observables.
We find that in the short and medium run -from one through eight quarters aheadthe NY Fed's root mean squared errors (henceforth, RMSEs) are comparable to the error of the median forecasts of both the Blue Chip and the SPF surveys. Relative to the median of the FOMC's SEP, the NY Fed DSGE model performs much better in terms of the accuracy of output growth forecasts, especially at longer horizons (three years ahead). The NY Fed DSGE model's inflation forecast performs worse than the median SEP up to a two year horizon, but better at a three year horizon and beyond. The results of the pseudo real-time forecasting exercise show that financial frictions play a major role, especially in terms of the projections for economic activity, as they imply a slow recovery from financial crisis -a result reminiscent of the findings of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) .
Real Real-Time Forecasts of NY Fed DSGE Model
This section begins with a brief description of the main features of the NY Fed DSGE model and of how they evolved over time. For the sake of brevity this description acts as a broadlevel overview, whereas all of the technical details are relegated to the Appendix and to other sources. The section then continues by documenting the model's forecasting accuracy from 2011, which was the first year in which the model was used to produce regular projections.
A Short History of the New York Fed DSGE Model
of policy analysis exercises but not for forecasting. In 2008, that model was replaced by a medium-scale (that is, similar to the model by Smets and Wouters, 2007 , in terms of features) New Keynesian DSGE model built along the lines of Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) and estimated with Bayesian methods using five time series: real GDP growth, core PCE inflation, hours, the labor share, and the federal funds rate.
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In mid-2010, the model began to be used internally for forecasting the U.S. economy, and from the end of 2010 onward, the model's forecasts have been produced systematically almost every FOMC cycle and incorporated into internal policy documents. At the time the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (henceforth, ZLB) was an important constraint on monetary policy (and remained so for another six years). We incorporated this constraint into the DSGE forecasts by augmenting the measurement equation with federal funds rate expectations obtained from financial markets, following the approach described in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) and Del Negro et al. (2012) . This approach amounted to forcing the model's expectations for the policy instrument to coincide with market expectations.
Since the latter of course took the ZLB into account, so did the DSGE projections. In order to enhance the model with the ability to accommodate federal funds rate expectations the policy rule in the model was augmented with anticipated policy shocks as used in Laseen and Svensson, 2011. These policy "news" shocks capture constraints on future policy, whether they are contractionary (i.e., when the anticipated policy rate is higher than predicted by the reaction function) or stimulative (i.e., when the anticipated policy rate is lower than predicted by the reaction function, as under a "forward guidance" policy).
In 2010, the model was further transformed by the addition of financial frictions, following the work of Christiano et al. (2003 Christiano et al. ( , 2014 . Specifically, the model incorporated a financial acceleratorà la Bernanke et al. (1999) , implying that firms' ability to invest is constrained by their leverage and more broadly by financial market conditions. In order to capture financial conditions quantitatively, we added the spreads between the yields of Baa corporate bonds and Treasuries to the model's set of observables. In June 2011, the NY Fed DSGE forecasts obtained from the model with financial frictions became part of a memo produced four times a year for the FOMC (Dotsey et al., 2011 ; see also page 2 of the June 2011 FOMC Minutes).
The model built in 2010, which is described in some detail in Del Negro et al. (2013) , continued to be the main workhorse for DSGE projections and policy analysis at the NY Fed until the end of 2014. It was then replaced by another New Keynesian model with 1 Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) and Del Negro et al. (2013) provide a detailed description of the model, priors, data, and estimation procedure.
financial frictions -referred to henceforth as the SWFF model and used in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) and Del Negro et al. (2015a) . Relative to the financial friction model introduced in 2010, SWFF was closer to the original Smets and Wouters (2007) model in terms of the specification of the household's utility function and other modeling details.
Importantly, its forecasting accuracy, especially in periods of financial stress such as the financial crisis, had been demonstrated in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) and Del Negro et al. (2016) . In addition, it had the advantage of adding investment and consumption to the set of observables.
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The SWFF model itself was never actually used in production at the NY Fed. Rather, we adopted a variant of this model, which we will call SWFF + . This was partly because the SWFF model used in academic papers measured inflation using the GDP deflator. However, the core PCE deflator was a more relevant measure for policy purposes. We therefore added this variable to the set of observables under the assumption that inflation in the model is the common component between these two empirical measures of inflation.
3 Moreover, at the time a debate on a possible secular decline in productivity growth begun in the early 2000s was raging (e.g., Gordon, 2015; Fernald, 2015) . Given the important policy implications of this debate we also added John Fernald's measure of total factor productivity growth (henceforth, TFP) to the data on which the model was estimated. In order to give the DSGE a chance to capture secular shifts in productivity growth we modeled TFP as the sum of two components: a trend-stationary one (as in Smets and Wouters, 2007) Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Justiniano et al. (2013) . Aruoba et al. (2016) . Note: These panels compare the RMSEs for NY Fed DSGE model forecasts (red circles) of real GDP growth and core PCE inflation from January 2011 to March 2016 to those of the Blue Chip Economic Indicators survey (blue diamonds, left), the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) (yellow diamonds, center), and the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) (purple diamonds, right). The Blue Chip and SPF forecasts are in terms of Q/Q percent rates and the SEP forecasts are expressed in Q4/Q4 average rates. When computing RMSEs, each external forecast is matched to the nearest preceding DSGE forecast in order to ensure comparability of results. Below each horizon we show out the number of observations.
are not given an informational advantage.
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The BCEI forecasts are reported in quarter-to-quarter (henceforth, Q/Q) percent change and are released monthly. We consider the April, July, October and January forecasts, as these are the last ones that are released prior to the release of the Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 GDP measurements. Under our matching scheme, these forecasts are typically paired with the forecasts produced for the March, June, September, and December FOMC meetings, respectively. The Blue Chip survey asks respondents to forecast from the current quarter until 8 Once a matching DSGE forecast is found, we transform and trim it to match the units and forecast horizon, respectively, of the survey forecast.
the end of the next calendar year, which sets the forecast horizon to range from 9 quarters in January (beginning in Q4 of the previous year) to 6 quarters in October. We follow the literature and compare the NY Fed DSGE forecast with the average BCEI projection, which is often referred to as the Consensus Blue Chip forecast.
The SPF is released at the beginning of the second month of each quarter, and is therefore matched with DSGE forecasts from the January, April, July, and October FOMC meetings, whenever possible. The SPF forecasts for core PCE inflation and real GDP growth are also in Q/Q percent change. Its forecast horizon is consistently five quarters. Fewer observations are available to compute this set of RMSEs because there are less often DSGE forecasts that both precede the SPF release and share the same first forecast quarter, as GDP is released at the end of the first month of each quarter. We compare the NY Fed DSGE forecast with the median SPF projection.
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Lastly, the SEP is released every other FOMC meeting beginning with the March meeting (the January meeting until June 2012). SEP participants project Q4/Q4 real GDP growth rates and core PCE inflation rates for the current year and up to three subsequent years. We compare the DSGE forecast with the median SEP projection.
10 Since DSGE forecasts are also produced in anticipation of each FOMC meeting, the corresponding DSGE forecasts are a natural match for the SEP projections. Note that while both Blue Chip and SPF surveys produce "fixed horizon" projections (that is, they are always released at a fixed interval before the quarter being forecasted), the SEP does not: in each year, there are four SEP releases which share the same first forecast year, but were made using different information sets. This is in contrast to the Blue Chip and SPF forecasts.
The three sets of RMSE comparisons shown in Figure 1 illustrate that over the 2011-2016 period the NY Fed DSGE projections are broadly competitive with survey forecasts in terms of accuracy. The left panel of Figure 1 shows that the NY Fed DSGE and BCEI RMSEs for output growth are virtually they same throughout the forecast horizon. 11 The DSGE model's output growth and core PCE inflation forecasts are moderately worse than 9 The median, rather than the mean, is used as the headline number on the Philadelphia Fed's website. 10 When the median is not available, we use the average of the upper and lower limits of the SEP central tendency, a range which excludes the three highest and three lowest forecasts of each variable in each year. 11 It may be surprising that the first quarter ahead DSGE forecasts (that is, the nowcasts) are as accurate as the BCEI's, given the latter's informational advantage. This results is driven by the fact that the NY Fed DSGE model conditions its projections on judgemental nowcasts from the staff in order to improve the short-run accuracy of its forecasts (see Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2013) . Section 3.4 elaborates on this issue. the SPF forecasts, but generally comparable. 12 The NY Fed DSGE model performs notably better than the SEP's output forecasts over all horizons from one to four years ahead (but we have only three four-year ahead observations). In terms of inflation, the median SEP is more accurate for one to two years ahead, but less accurate for three years ahead.
Next, Figure The discrepancy between the DSGE's output RMSEs on the left and middle two plots and the relatively worse performance of the DSGE versus the SPF are likely due to the fact that for the reasons discussed above, there are many fewer DSGE forecasts matching the SPF forecast vintages. Moreover, we think that for some of these forecasts, the information set is actually smaller than that of the SPF, in that the latest quarter GDP release was not available when the forecast was produced. In the latter half of the sample, that is, from 2014 onward,the DSGE models' forecasts are less accurate over the short run but still reasonably accurate over the medium and long term. It is worth noting that by 2015, the SEP and DSGE output growth forecasts have largely aligned. For inflation, the DSGE models' forecasts are often more downbeat than the SEP, predicting only a gradual return of inflation to the FOMC's long-run goal of two percent. Especially in later years, the DSGE tends to systematically under-predict inflation, while the SEP tends to over-predict it, as it always projects inflation to return to two percent inflation within a couple of years.
Real-Time Dataset and DSGE Forecasts Setup
The models used in this section are the prototypical Smets and Wouters (2007) model (henceforth, SW), which does not have financial frictions; the SWFF model; and the two "descendants" of SWFF mentioned in Section 2.1, SWFF + and SWFF ++ . In this section, we first discuss the data series used for these models (shown below in Table 1 ) and the process of constructing a real-time dataset. Next, we discuss the construction of the Blue Chip forecasts dataset -our benchmark for evaluating the accuracy of the DSGE forecasts. In the construction of both the real-time and the Blue Chip forecasts datatset we follow the approach of Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013, section 4.1) and Edge and Gürkaynak (2010) .
Last, we discuss the DSGE forecast setup. is obtained from the Labor Productivity and Costs release, and produced by the BLS at a quarterly frequency.
The federal funds rate (in the remainder of the paper we will sometimes use the acronym Lastly, TFP growth is measured using John Fernald's TFP growth series, unadjusted for changes in utilization. We use his estimate of (1 − α) to convert it into labor-augmenting terms. The details of the data transformations are given in Section A.6 of the appendix.
Blue Chip Forecasts
We primarily compare our pseudo real-time forecasts to contemporaneous ones from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BCEI) and the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (BCFF), two monthly surveys of business economists' projections for macroeconomic and financial variables, respectively. In this paper, we are interested in forecasts of real GDP growth and (GDP deflator) inflation from the BCEI and forecasts of the federal funds rate from 13 Since the Blue Chip survey reports long-run inflation expectations only twice a year, we treat these expectations in the remaining quarters as missing observations and adjust the measurement equation of the Kalman filter accordingly.
the BCFF. In the RMSE comparisons below, we compare our DSGE model forecasts to the mean BCEI GDP growth and inflation forecasts and the median BCFF federal funds rate forecast. The BCEI survey is published on the 10th of each month, using data that were available at the beginning of the month; the BCFF survey is published on the 1st of each month. Though both surveys are released on a monthly basis, we restrict our attention to the January, April, July, and October forecasts. These are the months in which the last forecast for each quarter is made.
For example, the BEA publishes the first estimate of fourth-quarter GDP at the end of January, and the first estimate of first-quarter GDP at the end of April. Hence the Blue Chip surveys released in February, March, and April contain forecasts in which the first forecasted quarter is Q1. The April Blue Chip survey is the last one to forecast Q1, and choosing it gives the Blue Chip forecasters the greatest informational advantage as they have access to all of the information released during Q1, and can potentially incorporate higher-frequency financial and other data into their forecasts.
The sample we consider contains the Blue Chip forecasts from January 1991 to April 2016 (this is the same sample of Section 2). Within this sample, we construct real-time datasets using data vintages available on the 10th of January, April, July, and October of each year.
We use the St. Louis Fed's ALFRED database as our primary source of vintaged data.
Hourly wage vintages are only available on ALFRED beginning in 1997; we use pre-1997
vintages from Edge and Gürkaynak (2010 the previous year) but only 6 quarters in October. For the majority of our sample (beginning in April 1997), BCFF respondents submit forecasts for 6 quarters in the months of January, April, July, and October and for 5 quarters in all other months. 15 The RMSEs are computed using data downloaded on November 1st, 2017.
DSGE Forecast Setup
In our baseline setup, we condition on external interest rate forecasts following Section 5.4
of Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) because this was the approach taken in generating the NY Fed DSGE model forecasts. We augment the measurement equation to add
where we use the median k-period ahead forecast from the BCFF for the observed series R e t+k|t , E t R t+k is the model-implied k-period ahead interest rate expectation, and R * is the steady-state interest rate. (See Section A in the Appendix for additional details.) In order to provide the model with the ability to accommodate federal funds rate expectations, the policy rule in the model was augmented with anticipated policy shocks, as discussed in section 2.1. We take the number of anticipated shocks K to be 6, which is the maximum number of BCFF forecast quarters (excluding the observed quarterly average that we impute in the first forecast period).
Specifically, in a given quarter t, the interest rate expectations observables R e t+1|t , . . . , R e t+K|t come from the BCFF forecast released in the first month of quarter t + 1. 
. . . . . .
We furthermore follow section 5.3 of Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) in conditioning on nowcasts -forecasts of the current quarter -of GDP growth, GDP deflator inflation, and financial variables. We accomplish this by appending an additional period of partially observed data for period T + 1 (the current quarter, given our timing convention).
18 Specifically, for each real-time forecast vintage, we condition on the corresponding BCEI release's mean forecasts of GDP growth and GDP deflator inflation in period T + 1. Our choice of forecast origin months means that the entire first forecast quarter has already elapsed by the time the forecast is made, so quarterly averages of financial variables have been observed in their entirety. Finally, we use the BCFF interest rate forecast R e T +2:T +K+1|T +1 as observed expectations of future interested in quarter T + 1. Table 2 summarizes the T + 1 conditioning information. Note that we do not use any of this T + 1 information in estimating the model parameters: these are estimated only using time T information. In fact, in the pseudo real-time forecasting exercise, we do not reestimate the DSGE model in every quarter, but 17 This restriction was also imposed when producing the NY Fed DSGE projections. 18 Unlike in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013), we treat the nowcast for T + 1 as a perfect signal of y T +1 , a specialization of both of the Noise and News assumptions in that paper in which we set η T +1 = 0. This is also what we do in the production of the NY Fed DSGE forecasts, although we usually rely on the staff's nowcast rather than the BCEI's.
only once a year using the January vintage.
The Importance of Financial Frictions
This section investigates the importance of financial frictions for the DSGE models' forecasting performance during the recovery. It does so by comparing the forecasting performance of the prototypical SW model with that of SWFF, a version of that model augmented with financial frictions.
The top and bottom panels of Figure 3 compare the RMSEs for SW (top row, red circles) and SWFF (bottom row, red circles) with the Blue Chip (blue diamonds) for output growth, inflation, and interest rates projections one through eight quarters ahead, computed from April 2011 to April 2016. For both models, the forecasts are conditional on the BCFF forecasts for the federal funds rate and the BCEI nowcasts for output growth and inflation.
(We do so because conditioning on external forecasts for the policy instrument and nowcasts was the standard procedure for the NY Fed DSGE projections during this period, as discussed above.) Figure 3 shows that the accuracy of the SWFF projections for output growth and inflation is comparable to that of the BCEI median forecasts. In fact, the output growth RMSEs for SWFF are also very similar to those of the NY Fed DSGE model shown in Figure 1 (upper left panel). The accuracy of the forecasts from the SW model is considerably worse however, especially for output. SWFF differs from SW because of both the addition of financial frictions (and spreads as observables) and the use of long run inflation expectations (and a time-varying inflation target). In order to understand why the SWFF model's forecasts are so much more accurate than SW's, Figure 4 shows the two models' forecasts computed using the January 2012 vintage.
The top and bottom rows show the forecast for the SW and SWFF model, respectively. Note: The top and bottom panels compare the RMSEs for the SW (top row, red circles) and SWFF (bottom row, red circles) DSGE models with the Blue Chip (blue diamonds) for one through eight quarters ahead for output growth, inflation, and interest rates. Output growth and inflation are expressed in Q/Q percent annualized terms, whereas interest rates are in quarterly annualized percentage points. The N = n labels under each x-axis tick indicate the number of observations available for both the BCEI and DSGE forecasts at that horizon. The forecasts included in these calculations are from April 2011 to April 2016. The DSGE forecasts are conditional on the BCFF forecasts for the federal funds rate, and the BCEI nowcasts for output growth and inflation. Section 3.2 provides the details of the forecast comparison exercise.
Recession. Like the NY Fed DSGE model, the SWFF model instead projects a slow recovery -its forecasts are indeed even more subdued than the BCEI projections. The January 2012 inflation projections from SW are also more off the mark than those from SWFF.
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The differences in the forecasts between SW and SWFF are not surprising if we consider 19 This is partly explained by the fact that the degree of nominal rigidities is lower in SW than in SWFF, as documented in Table A Note: The panels show the DSGE forecasts obtained using data available as of January 2012 (red solid), the January 2012 Blue Chip forecast (blue solid line); real-time data (black solid); and revised final data from November 1st, 2017 (gray dashed) of output, inflation, and the interest rate. The DSGE forecasts are conditional on the BCFF forecasts for the federal funds rate, and the BCEI nowcasts for output growth and inflation. The top and bottom rows show the forecast for the SW and SWFF model, respectively. Output growth and inflation are expressed in Q/Q percent annualized terms, whereas interest rates are in quarterly annualized percentage points.
the different explanations these two models have for the Great Recession. Figure 5 and are represented by light blue bars). Figure 6 shows that both of these shocks have much less persistent effects on GDP growth than risk premium shocks in SWFF.
In conclusion, the SW model interprets the Great Recession as due to disturbances whose effects on the economy are relatively transitory, in contrast to the SWFF model in which financial shocks have much more persistent effect on output growth. This implies that the SW model expects a faster return of the economy to steady state, and therefore high growth rates of the economy. In addition, when these high growth rates do not materialize in the aftermath of the recession, the model attributes these forecast misses to additional Note: The panels compare the SW (top panels) and SWFF (bottom panels) DSGE models' impulse response functions of real GDP growth to one-standard-deviation innovations in the discount factor (left), marginal efficiency of investment (center), and contemporaneous monetary policy (right) shocks. Parameters estimated using the baseline January 2012 dataset are used.
temporary negative shocks, that are followed by a quick recovery. As the effect of these shocks compounds, SW ends up predicting very high growth rates for the economy, as shown in 
Real GDP Growth
Note: The figure shows the SWFF forecast for real GDP growth beginning in 1982Q1 (red solid); real-time data (black solid); and revised final data from November 1st, 2017 (gray dashed) of real GDP growth. The forecast was generated using April 1982 data, using the parameters from the January 2016 estimation.
outcomes. This is the case because the model attributes the recession to disturbances whose effect on the economy is more transient than that of financial shocks, such as monetary policy shocks.
Conditioning on FFR Expectations
As discussed before, in our baseline analysis, we condition on interest rate forecasts from the BCFF in both the estimation and forecast steps in order to incorporate additional information available in the era of central bank forward guidance. This section investigates the impact of that choice. Figure 8 shows the RMSEs of the SW and SWFF models when we do not use BCFF interest rate forecasts. 21 The sample is the same as Note: The top and bottom panels compare the RMSEs for the SW (top row, red circles) and SWFF (bottom row, red circles) DSGE models with the Blue Chip (blue diamonds) for one through eight quarters ahead for output growth, inflation, and interest rates. Output growth and inflation are expressed in Q/Q percent annualized terms, whereas interest rates are in quarterly annualized percentage points. The N = n labels under each x-axis tick indicate the number of observations available for both the BCEI and DSGE forecasts at that horizon. The forecasts included in these calculations are from April 2011 to April 2016. The DSGE forecasts are conditional on the BCEI nowcasts for output growth and inflation. Section 3.3 provides the details of the forecast comparison exercise.
in the absence of interest rate expectations data, but remain sensibly above those of the SWFF model. In order to understand the effect of conditioning on FFR expectations on the two models, we again focus on a specific set of forecasts -those computed using the January 2012
vintage. Figure 9 is analogous to Figure 4 , except that the DSGE projections are computed without using FFR expectations. Clearly, both DSGE models predict an earlier liftoff of the Note: The panels show the DSGE forecasts obtained using data available as of January 2012 (red solid); the January 2012 Blue Chip forecast (blue solid line); real-time data (black solid); and revised final data from November 1st, 2017 (gray dashed) of output, inflation, and the interest rate. The DSGE forecasts are conditional on the BCEI nowcasts for output growth and inflation. The top and bottom rows show the forecasts for the SW and SWFF models, respectively. Output growth and inflation are expressed in Q/Q percent annualized terms, whereas interest rates are in quarterly annualized percentage points.
federal funds rate relative to both the BCFF projections and ex-post outcomes. This is not surprising: Blue Chip forecasters are aware of the Federal Reserve's forward guidance while the DSGE econometrician, without conditioning on either market or survey expectations, is not (which is why in the NY Fed DSGE model we condition on federal funds rate expectations). We also note that SWFF projects a faster liftoff of the policy rate than SW. This is not surprising in light of the fact that SW projects inflation to be (counterfactually) lower than SWFF, and that the estimated policy reaction function, which is the basis of the FFR projections for the DSGE models, depends positively on inflation. This observation explains why the RMSEs for the federal funds rate shown in Figure 9 are worse for SWFF than for SW.
The differences in the DSGE forecasts for output growth and inflation between Figures 4 and 9 illustrate the effect of conditioning on FFR expectations. From the perspective of the DSGE econometrician, forward guidance can be interpreted in two different ways, as either "Odyssean" or "Delphic" (see Campbell et al., 2012) . The Odyssean interpretation amounts to anticipated future monetary policy accommodation -the policy "news" shocks discussed in Section 2.1. The Delphic interpretation instead leads the econometrician to revise her assessment of the state of the economy, which is of course latent in DSGE models: the lower FFR projections are then interpreted as an indication that the state of the economy is worse than previously estimated.
Both effects are at play in the DSGE projections. However, the comparison of Figures 4 and 9 indicates that the Odyssean effect is very strong particularly for the SW model: In Figure 3 . For the SWFF model, the differences in both forecasts and RMSEs with and without conditioning on FFR expectations are much more muted than for the SW model. This is both because the way SWFF interprets forward guidance is different from SW, and because SWFF is less affected by the "forward guidance puzzle". Note: The panels compare the RMSEs for SWFF (red circles) with the Blue Chip (blue diamonds) for one through eight quarters ahead for output growth, inflation, and interest rates. Output growth and inflation are expressed in Q/Q percent annualized terms, whereas interest rates are in quarterly annualized percentage points. The N = n labels under each x-axis tick indicate the number of observations available for both the BCEI and DSGE forecasts at that horizon. Forecast origins from April 2011 to April 2016 only are included in these calculations. Section 3.4 provides the details of the forecast comparison exercise. Schorfheide, 2004; Del Negro et al., 2007) . Another challenge arises from the limitations of the econometrician's information set-that is the set of observables used in estimating the model and generating forecasts. Augmenting the set of observables with spreads, for instance, as the SWFF model does, provides valuable information to the econometrician regarding financial conditions. Similarly, conditioning on FFR expectations informs the econometrician about the degree of future policy accommodation. A third challenge is given by the timeliness of the econometrician's information set: The majority of the data seriesboth "hard" (monthly releases of inflation and consumption) and "soft" (e.g., from surveys, such as the Institute for Supply Management survey, or ISM) -used in the estimation of our model become available at a quarterly frequency and therefore do not include all the information available at higher frequency. Blue Chip forecasters use this information to produce nowcasts for output and inflation. For this reason, the DSGE model current-quarter forecasts stand to benefit from conditioning on the nowcasts obtained from the Blue Chip survey. Similarly, the NY Fed forecasts discussed in Section 2 incorporate the nowcast from in-house forecasters.
How much does incorporating the nowcast improve the DSGE forecasts? Figure 10 depicts RMSEs for SWFF and the Blue Chip forecasts for output growth, inflation, and the nominal federal funds rate without conditioning on nowcasts. The sample is the same as Figure 3 -April 2011 to April 2016-and we continue to condition on the BCFF FFR expectations. Not surprisingly, the Blue Chip nowcasts are much more accurate than the DSGE's for both output growth and inflation. However, for output growth the RMSEs are quite similar to those in Figure 3 from horizon 2 onward, while for inflation the improvement associated with including nowcasts persists for about 4 quarters. Therefore, we confirm the results in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) that the positive effect of conditioning on the nowcast on inflation is much more persistent than the corresponding effect on GDP, which is not surprising in light of the different persistence in the two series. Note: The panels compare the RMSEs for SWFF (red circles) with the Blue Chip (blue diamonds) for one through eight quarters ahead for output growth, inflation, and interest rates. Output growth and inflation are expressed in Q/Q percent annualized terms, whereas interest rates are in quarterly annualized percentage points. The N = n labels under each x-axis tick indicate the number of observations available for both the BCEI and DSGE forecasts at that horizon. The forecasts included in these calculations are from January 1991 to April 2016. The DSGE forecasts are conditional on the BCFF forecasts for the federal funds rate, and the BCEI nowcasts for output growth and inflation. Section 3.5 provides the details of the forecast comparison exercise.
The results so far, and in much of the paper, focus on forecasting during the recovery from the Great Recession, because this is the period of interest and the one for which we have forecasts from the NY Fed DSGE model. This section turns to the question of how the DSGE models fared across our entire available sample of 1992-2017, for the sake of comparison with the previous literature on the accuracy of DSGE model forecasts for the U.S. As in the previous sections, we condition on time T + 1 BCEI forecasts of output 23 As noted in Section 3.1, the nowcast is treated simply as T + 1 data, as opposed to a noisy measurement of the forecasted variables at time T + 1 as in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) . We do so because this is the approach taken in producing the NY Fed DSGE forecasts. and inflation. Interest rate expectations are incorporated starting in 2008Q4, to match the beginning of the ZLB period. Figure 11 shows that the SWFF model's performance is remarkably similar to that of the Blue Chip forecasts across all horizons and variables. As far as output and inflation are concerned, this finding is in line with that of Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013) . Interest rate projections are moderately worse in the short to medium run, but overall are comparable in performance. This last point is notable given the lack of interest rate expectations from 1992-2008Q3, and indicates that the model is capable of producing reasonable interest rate forecasts away from the zero lower bound.
Edge and Gürkaynak (2010)'s results showed that the accuracy of DSGE models' forecasts is comparable to that of private forecasters. One could dismiss those findings on the ground that they applied to the Great Moderation period, an easy period to forecast.
24
These results shown here are notable because they document that the accuracy of DSGE models' forecasts is comparable to that of private forecasters even though almost half of the sample includes periods that are particularly difficult for DSGE models, such as the Great Recession and its aftermath.
SWFF vs. Its Descendants
As described in Section 2.1, the main models used in producing the various internal policy materials and forecasts were built on top of SWFF, mainly by adding more observables (and more features to accommodate these observables).
25 In this section, we ask to what extent these choices changed the DSGE's forecasting accuracy. Comparing the RMSEs from SWFF in Figure 3 to the RMSEs shown below in Figure 12 , we see that the near-term and medium-term output growth forecast performance slightly declined from SWFF to SWFF + and from SWFF + to SWFF ++ , whereas long-term forecasting performance improved a bit from horizons 7 and beyond, even outperforming the Blue Chip forecast at that horizon.
Near-term and medium-term forecasts of inflation remained largely on par between SWFF and its descendants, but in a similar fashion to the output growth forecasts, long-term performance from horizon 6 and beyond improved. Note: The top and bottom panels compare the RMSEs for the SWFF + (top row, red circles) and SWFF ++ (bottom row, red circles) DSGE models with the Blue Chip (blue diamonds) for one through eight quarters ahead for output growth, inflation, and interest rates. Output growth and inflation are expressed in Q/Q percent annualized terms, whereas interest rates are in quarterly annualized percentage points. The N = n labels under each x-axis tick indicate the number of observations available for both the BCEI and DSGE forecasts at that horizon. The forecasts included in these calculations are from April 2011 to April 2016. The DSGE forecasts are conditional on the BCFF forecasts for the federal funds rate, and the BCEI nowcasts for output growth and inflation. Section 3.6 provides the details of the forecast comparison exercise.
Conclusions
The paper documents the accuracy of the projections of the NY Fed DSGE model during the recovery from the financial crisis. We find that in the short and medium run -from one through eight quarters ahead-our DSGE models' RMSEs are comparable to those obtained from the mean and median forecasts of the Blue Chip and SPF surveys, respectively. Relative to the median of the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections, however, the NY Fed DSGE model performed much better in terms of the accuracy of its output growth forecasts, especially at longer horizons. For inflation, the DSGE performed worse than the median SEP up to a two year horizon, but better at a three year horizon. The paper then uses a pseudo real-time forecasting exercise to assess which model features explain the results.
It finds that financial frictions play a major role, especially in terms of the projections for economic activity, as they imply a slow recovery from financial crises. (3)- (12) and (15) where R t is the usual contemporaneous policy shock and R k,t−k is a policy shock that is known to agents at time t − k, but affects the policy rule k periods later -that is, at time t. As outlined in Laseen and Svensson (2011) , these anticipated policy shocks allow us to capture the effects of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, as well as the effects of forward guidance in monetary policy.
Smets

A.1.2 Measurement Equations
The SW model is estimated using seven quarterly macroeconomic time series, whose measurement equations are given below:
Output growth
= γ + 100(y t − y t−1 + z t ) Consumption growth = γ + 100(c t − c t−1 + z t )
Investment growth
Real Wage growth = γ + 100(w t − w t−1 + z t )
where all variables are measured in percent, π * and R * measure the steady-state levels of net inflation and short term nominal interest rates, respectively, andl represents the mean of the hours (this variable is measured as an index).
The priors for the DSGE model parameters are the same as in Smets and Wouters (2007) and are summarized in Panel I of the priors table listed in the SW ++ section.
A.2 SWπ
The SWπ model builds on SW by allowing the inflation target to be time-varying. The time-varying inflation target, π * t , allows us to capture the dynamics of inflation and interest rates in the estimation sample.
The time-varying inflation target evolves according to
where 0 < ρ π * < 1 and π * ,t is an i.i.d. shock. π * t is a stationary process, although the prior on ρ π * forces this process to be highly persistent.
A.2.1 Measurement Equations
As in Aruoba and Schorfheide (2008) In the long-term inflation expectation transformation, 0.50 is the average difference between CPI and GDP annualized inflation from the beginning of the sample to 1992.
A.7 Inference, Prior and Posterior Parameter Estimates
We estimate the model using Bayesian techniques. This requires the specification of a prior distribution for the model parameters. For most parameters common with Smets and Wouters (2007), we use the same marginal prior distributions. As an exception, we favor a looser prior than Smets and Wouters (2007) for the quarterly steady-state inflation rate π * ; it is centered at 0.75% and has a standard deviation of 0.4%. Regarding the financial frictions, we specify priors for the parameters SP * , ζ sp,b , ρ σω , and σ σω , while we fix the parameters corresponding to the steady-state default probability and the survival rate of entrepreneurs, respectively. In turn, these parameters imply values for the parameters of (A-26). Information on the priors and posterior mean is provided in Note: The panels compare the RMSEs for the SWπ DSGE model (red circles) with the Blue Chip (blue diamonds) for one through eight quarters ahead for real output growth, GDP deflator inflation, and interest rates. Output growth and inflation are expressed in Q/Q percent annualized terms, whereas interest rates are in quarterly annualized percentage points. The N = n labels under each x-axis tick indicate the number of observations available for both the BCEI and DSGE forecasts at that horizon. Forecast origins from January 2011 to January 2016 only are included in these calculations. Note: The panels compare the RMSEs for the SWFF DSGE model (red circles) with the Blue Chip (blue diamonds) for one through eight quarters ahead for real output growth, GDP deflator inflation, and interest rates. Output growth and inflation are expressed in Q/Q percent annualized terms, whereas interest rates are in quarterly annualized percentage points. The N = n labels under each x-axis tick indicate the number of observations available for both the BCEI and DSGE forecasts at that horizon. Forecast origins from January 2011 to January 2016 only are included in these calculations. In this exercise, we re-estimated and forecasted the SWFF model without FFR expectations data. Compare to the RMSEs in Figure 8 , which were computed from the baseline parameter draws (estimated using FFR expectations data).
B.2 Estimating and Forecasting without FFR Expectations
